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• Debris risk mitigations were implemented since the 
inception of the SSP
• Debris struck the Space Shuttle Columbia (STS-107) 
during ascent causing the tragic loss
• SSP elevated the need to understand and limit debris 
hazards associated with launch phase
• Debris hazards remain top risks for the Space Shuttle 
Vehicle (SSV) due to analytical uncertainties and limited 
controls
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Systems Engineering processes integrate skills with 
resources to define and methodically service the 
Space Shuttle Program (SSP) need to limit debris risk
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Top Debris Risk Types
• Liftoff Debris
– Begins Day of Launch (DOL) from tanking through vehicle tower 
clear
– Subject of this presentation
• Ascent Debris
– Begins DOL after vehicle tower clear until External Tank separation
• Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris
– Begins DOL after External Tank Separation until Re-entry
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Space Shuttle Liftoff Debris Definition
4Critical Debris Zone in Red
• Liftoff debris is any hazardous mass transporting inside 
the Critical Debris Zone on DOL from tanking 
through vehicle tower clear 
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Examples: Space Shuttle Program Liftoff Debris
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NASA Systems Engineering Process (NPR 7123.1A)
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Liftoff Debris Systems Engineering Process
- Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board (CAIB) Report
- KSC, JSC, MSFC
- Shuttle Element Projects 
(e.g. Orbiter, External Tank, etc)
- NSTS 07700
- NSTS 60559
- NSTS 16007
- Testing
- Analyses
- Technical Boards
- Launch Pad Controls
- Walkdowns
- LOD Risk Management
- IDBR-01
- CRs & Process
- Models & Analyses
- Database
- Mapping Tool
- Walkdowns
- IIFA Process
- Statistical trending
- Imagery Review
- DOL Analyses
- What needs to be improved
- Resource/Asset Transaction
- Improvements
- Lessons learned
- Closeout
- Imagery Review
- Models
- Statistics
- Testing (Material, Ballistic, 
Wind Tunnel)
- Debris Sims
- Pad Repair Process
- Inspection Process
- KSC ERB
- PSE&I CERB/PRB
- DIG
- FRR Process
1. Stakeholder Expectations 
Definition
Requirements Definitions 
Processes
Technical Solution 
Definition Processes
Technical Planning Process
Product Realization
Technical Management
System Design
Technical Control Processes
Technical Assessment 
Process
Technical Decision 
Analysis Process
Product Transition 
Process
Evaluation Processes
Design Realization 
Processes
2. Technical Requirements 
Definition
3.   Logical Decomposition
- Liberation
- Transport
- Damage Tolerance
4. Design Solution Definition
- Mitigation processes 
(disposition categories)
-Tests, Maps, Models, 
Simulations, & Databases
10. Technical Planning
11. Requirements Management
12. Interface Management
13. Technical Risk Management
14. Configuration Management
15. Technical Data Management
16. Technical Assessment
17. Decision Analysis
9. Product Transition
5. Product Implementation
6. Product Integration
7. Product Verification
8. Product Validation
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STS-119 revealed a bolt liberation trend on the Fixed 
Service Structure (FSS) 275’ level elevator room
Example of Liftoff Debris Systems Engineering Process
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11) Bolts violated accepted risk (STS-120, STS-126, and STS-119)
15) LOD Team adds new debris finding to database, compares to existing entries, and identifies trend
3) LOD Team characterized analysis parameters (mass range, drag model, release timing, starting location, etc.)
16) MSFC analysts provided transport analysis showing criticality of this region and why this condition was unacceptable 
17) LOD decided to elevate issue to management & KSC engineers through IFA process 
1) LOD Team conveyed hazard to stakeholders [KSC, JSC, MSFC]
4) LOD Team coordinated with KSC engineers to ensure repair adequately mitigated the 
liberation of bolts
14) KSC updated configuration to reflect planned repair procedures
5) Interim repair verified each bolt was tight and applied RTV over bolt heads
10) Coordinated IIFA closure process
13) Due to repairs, no change in overall risk posture or requirements
13) Issue (as part of IIFA) documented in backup section of hazard report
7) Pad walkdown to check that repair was implemented per plan
8) Pad walkdown to check that the interim repair survived launch
5) Final repair replaced old bolts with new stainless steel fasteners
7) Pad walkdown to check that repair was implemented per plan
8) Pad walkdown to check that the final repair survived launch
System Design Processes (1–4)     Product Realization Processes (5–9)    Technical Management Processes (10–17)
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Liftoff Debris Operational Phase of Systems Engineering
Documentation
Requirements:
NSTS 07700 Vol X Bk 1
NSTS 60559 Vol 1
NSTS 08303
NSTS 16007
Analytical Resources:
NSTS 60559 Vol 3
- Analysis Methodology 
Sub-tier Methodology Docs.
Ascent Debris Source Database 
Liftoff Debris Website
- Analyses, Assessments, Links
Liftoff Debris Database
Integrated Hazard Reports:
IDBR-01 - Integrated Debris
Risks:
SIRMA Risk # 2846
Change Management
Boards [CM, PSE&I CERB/PRB, KSC ERB, SICB, PRCB]
Debris Integration Group (DIG) [MSFC, JSC, KSC, AMES] 
[Orbiter, SSME, ET, RSRB, GO, S&MA]
Imagery Integration Working Group (IIWG) [MSFC, JSC, KSC]
Shuttle Integrated Risk Management Application (SIRMA)
Launch Pad Readiness
Procedures/Controls
Hardware Configuration
/Condition
Analyses
Testing (Materials, Ballistics)
Modeling/Simulation
Statistics
Risk Assessments
Individual items
Bounding analyses
Accepted Risks/Hazards
Flight Readiness
KSC Pad Readiness Review
PSE&I Flight Readiness Review
SE&I Flight Readiness Review
MSFC Center Director Flight Readiness Review
Program Flight Readiness Review
Assess Liftoff Debris Each Launch 
Integrated In-Flight Anomaly (IIFA) Process [MSFC, JSC, KSC]
Launch Pad Walkdowns
Imagery Reviews [MSFC, JSC, KSC]
Instrumentation
Tracking & Trending of Debris
Day of Launch
Debris team communication between:
Huntsville Operation Support Center (HOSC) [MSFC]
Launch Control Center (LCC) [KSC]
Mission Control Center (MCC) [JSC]
Final Inspection Team (FIT) [KSC]
Imagery [KSC]
Natural Environments
Shuttle Elements (Orbiter, SSME, ET, RSRB, GO)
Shuttle Integration Management [MSFC, JSC, KSC]
Real Time Liftoff Debris Analyses & Assessments
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Flight Readiness
10
• Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) for Liftoff debris 
includes
– Lift-off debris from previous mission 
dispositioned
– Flight acceptance rationale has been provided 
for Lift-off debris sources/causes
– Lift-off debris mission support documentation, 
processes and tools are in place for the 
up-coming mission
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Day of Launch & Liftoff Debris Team Systems Engineering
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MSFC Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC)
• Facilitates Space Shuttle Vehicle monitoring 
• Provides capability to analyze launch data, and assist in day of launch 
problem resolution. 
• Enables integrated connections among element prime contractors and 
the KSC Launch Control Center.
Liftoff Debris Team
• Assembles proper skills and resources 
• Provides coordinated analytical transactions to characterize potential 
liftoff debris hazards
• Communicates among stakeholders via voice loops and emails
• Enables element hardware owners to assess risk posed by potential 
liftoff debris hazards
Day of Launch Communications
MSFC KSC JSC
Management X X X
Engineering X X X
Integration X X X
Safety X X X
Orbiter (Boeing) X X
SSME (Pratt & Whitney) X X
ET (Lockheed Martin) X X
RSRB/RSRM  (ATK/USA) X X
Ground Operations (USA) X
Damage Assessment Team X
Final Inspection Team X
Imagery X X
Radar X
Debris Integration Group X X X
Ascent Debris X X
Liftoff Debris X
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* Other support sites exist & are 
communicated with across the country
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Liftoff Debris Data Collection After Each Launch
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- Characterizes each debris item
- All Post Columbia Launches 
- Database content:
-- Mission data (#, wind data, time, hardware)
-- Debris properties (mass, size, material, etc.)
-- Locations (pre- & post-launch)
-- Imagery info (camera observations, timing)
-- Resolution (mitigation or risk assessment)
Environmental Change 
Identification & Analyses Debris Source Identification
Instrumentation DatabasesDebris Database
Compile & Synthesize Launch Data
Imagery Database
Post Launch Pad Walk Down 
Records Each Liftoff Debris Case
Instrumentation Data Reviews 
Technical Panels (JSC & MSFC)
Imagery Reviews 
(KSC JSC MSFC)
+
+
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Assess Liftoff Debris Post Launch 
In Flight Anomaly Resolution 
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Statistically Assess Debris
- Total number, mass, material, 
location, debris type, etc.
- Communicate areas of 
concern
Constituent 
Element IFAs 
(K-IFAs)
- Assess Repairs, 
Mitigations, & 
Closure Plan
- Provide 
recommend-
ations and 
integrated 
concerns 
based on 
Liftoff analyses
Develop Integrated Flight Rationale
- Mitigation Efforts (Repair, Removal, Inspection)
- Risk Assessment
Integrated In-Flight Anomaly (IIFA) 
Resolution Process
Characterize and Categorize 
Debris Observations
- Risk Assessment / Mitigation 
Approach
Kennedy In Flight Anomaly (KIFA) 
• Launch and Landing Debris 
• Launch Support GSE and Facilities Abnormalities
Integrated In Flight Anomaly (IIFA) for LOD 
• Debris Violations Prior To Pad Clearance 
IFA Responsibilities
• KIFA 
– Assess anomalies 
– Coordinate expertise to evaluate potential issues for; launch support 
systems and facilities/or hazards
– Promote corrective action
– Document rationale 
• IIFA 
– Assess anomalies 
– Coordinate expertise to evaluate potential cross element issues 
and/or impacts to integrated hazards.
– Promote corrective action
– Document rationale 
IFA Adjudication Authorities related to LOD
• KIFA: KSC Engineering Review Board (ERB)
• IIFA:  Systems Integration Control Board (SICB)
Compile and Synthesize Data
- Pad Walk-down Reports and S6444 SIMS Images
- Critical Pad Debris (size, mass, material, etc.)
- Film Review Observations (timing, etc.)
Identify Integrated Debris Items
Assess & Characterize 
Changes in Risk
Identify Changes for 
Documentation
- Assessed Sources 
(NSTS 60559 / ADSD)
- Hazard Report (IDBR-01)
Closure Board 
Review
Reference: NSTS 08126 Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System Requirements 
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Change Management – Example Changes
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Legend of Acronyms
PSE&I - Propulsion Systems Engineering & Integration
PSE&I PRB - PSE&I Project Review Board
PSE&I CERB - PSE&I Chief Engineer Review Board
KSC ERB - Kennedy Space Center Engineering Review Board
SICB - Systems Integration Control Board
PRCB - Program Requirements Control Board 
DIG - Debris Integration Group
IIWG - Imagery Integration Working Group
SIRMA - Shuttle Integrated Risk Management Application
ISERP/MSERP - Integrated/MSFC Safety Engineering Review Panel
Tech Panels - Technical Panels (e.g. Aerodynamics, Loads & 
Dynamics, Thermal, Instrumentation, etc.)
Change Type
- Hardware removal or repair to acceptable state  .
- New/update debris controls at Launch Pad   ……
- New/updated analyses  ……………………………
- New/updated instrumentation   ……………………
- New/updated imagery  ……………………………..
- New/updated risk assessment   …………………..
- New/updated requirements   ………………………
Associated Board, Panel, or Working Group
KSC ERB
KSC ERB, PSE&I CERB/PRB, SICB
PSE&I CERB/PRB, DIG, SICB, 
Tech Panels (Aero, Thermal, etc.)
KSC ERB, Tech Panels
IIWG, SICB
PSE&I CERB/PRB, SICB, MSERP, ISERP
PSE&I CERB/PRB, SICB, PRCB
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Elements of Change Management
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Directives
Requests
CPE works action 
& Presents to 
CERB/PRB
PRCB assign 
directive thru 
CM
CM 
closes 
directive
CERB/PRB 
Approved
?
YesGoverning 
Board 
Approved
?
CPE 
presents to 
Gov. Board
No
Yes
No
Project / 
Office 
initiates CR
CM 
distributes CR 
to evaluators
CPE manages 
evaluators 
input
Yes
No
CPE presents 
to CERB/PRB
CPE 
presents to 
Gov. Board
Governing 
Board 
Approved
?
CM 
incorporates 
change
CERB/PRB 
submits 
evaluation
CERB - Chief Engineer Review Board
CM - Configuration Management
CR - Change Request
CPE - Change Package Engineer
PRB - Project Review Board
PRCB - Program Requirements Control Board
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Pad Readiness Standings
- Launch pad repair & construction occurs pre-rollout
- KSC Pad Readiness Review certifies area for SSV rollout
- Enhanced control requirements commence
- KSC Final inspection (T-4 hours) 
- Perform DOL debris assessments as required  
Launch Pad Readiness
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Example Launch Pad Walk Down Map
In Flight Anomaly (IFA) Resolution 
- Closure rationale is produced by IFA owner
- Closure typically occurs before next launch
- Records corrective action
- Identifies statistical trends in nominal debris 
attributes
LOD Team Post Launch Pad Walk 
Down Inspections 
- Inspections occur ≤ T +7 days 
- Assesses pad conditions
- Reports map liftoff debris concerns, 
with descriptions, and pictures  
- Prioritizes KSC concerns for work 
prior to next launch
Continuous Foreign Object Debris (FOD) Walk Down Inspections
- Multiple daily FOD inspections occur to limit FOD proximate to all SSV systems
- FOD database recorded metrics & findings
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Liftoff Debris Analyses
17
Objectives
- Recognize liftoff debris hazards that put Space Shuttle systems at risk
- Reveal effective methods to control liftoff debris 
- Understand the nature and surrounding conditions of liftoff debris
Subjects of Analysis
- Liberation
- Transport
- Damage Tolerance
Expertise & Resources
- Shuttle Projects: 
- SE&I, OV, ET, SSME, RSRB, RSRM , Prime Contractors
- Engineering: 
- Propulsion Systems, Materials & Processes, Impact Tests, Ballistics, Models, Simulations
- Safety & Mission Assurance: 
- Statistical & Probabilistic Analysis, Hazard Analysis
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Temporal Properties
Debris Transport Analysis Process
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Typical Vehicle Position with Time During Liftoff 
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Computer Aided Design Models Detail Position & Geometry of Major Structures
Temporal and Spatial Framework of Analyses
Wind Directions With Respect to 
Shuttle & Pad Structures
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Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Analyses
• Simulate Interaction of Wind and Plumes with the Vehicle and 
Launch Pad Structure
– Transient  Models 
– Steady State Models
• Quantify parameters to enable debris transport analyses
– Wind & Gravity Features
– Plume Entrainment & Plume Driven Features
• Complete model validations via comparison with actual launch 
data  imagery and instrumentation records
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Debris Transport Analyses (DTA)
• DTA reveals time, position, velocity, and 
impact energy for specific debris shapes 
and densities 
– Uses CFD generated flow field environments 
– Integrates temporal, atmospheric, physical 
and geometric properties into analysis
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Analyzing  Debris Materials & Impact Tests
• Materials tests & analyses 
– Reveals compositions & densities 
– Verifies specifications & processes 
– Provides key aspects in failure diagnostics
• Impact tests & analyses  
– Provides basis to establish debris transport 
boundaries 
– Reveals features of impactor break-up and 
rebound
– Demonstrates impact vulnerability of flight 
hardware to specific impactor
– Validates impact models
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FRSI 
HRSI Lower Surfaces  (Belly Tile)
HRSI Upper Surfaces
LRSI
AFRSI
RCC Windows
Impact Analyses
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• Damage threshold specifications are 
element project office responsibility
• DTA results are sorted into position 
bins according to element
– SRB, ET, SSME and Orbiter
• Orbiter DTA results are sorted into 
bins according to surface material
– FRSI, LRSI, AFRSI, RCC, HRSI Upper, 
HRSI Lower, and Windows
RSRM/SRB
Surfaces
ET Surfaces
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SSME
Surfaces
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Shuttle Integrated Risk Management
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Risk Assessments
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• Baseline liftoff debris assessment methodology
– Identify and characterize key types of persistent debris
– Characterize key debris types 
• Source locations
• Material
• Risk assessment mass 
– DTA to prioritize hazardous source locations of debris
– Record statistics of debris attributes
• Assign mitigation for each debris items
– Limit debris occurrence through mitigation
– Establish mitigation categories
– Identify limitations in analyses and mitigation controls
• Assess effectiveness and trends
– Quantify debris: instances, types, masses, locations, 
mitigations, etc.
– Ascertain changes in debris attributes
– Develop statistical trends
• Establish normal boundaries
• Detect outliers to investigate further
– Qualify debris hazards based on bounding assumptions
• Compare changes to previous risk assessment
• Communicate risk to Space Shuttle Program for disposition
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Lessons Learned to Mitigate Liftoff Debris Risk
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• Systems Engineering process can be effectively applied to mitigate liftoff debris for 
future space launch systems
• Require launch pad design metrics to minimize liftoff debris generation
– Design structures without places for debris to hide
– Avoid designing areas difficult to access for repair of rust/corrosion
– Establish pad cleanliness standards
– Minimize hardware closest to vehicle
• Plume driven debris is a significant hazard due to high energy content
– Avoid protrusions in plume flow that can direct flow upward toward the vehicle
– Multi-plume interaction on launch pad deck produces transient fountain effect with upward flow
– If upward flows exist, mitigate them (e.g. intense water flow)
• Integrate appropriate liftoff debris and system owner expertise into launch facility 
walkdown inspections
• Integrate imagery surveillance  into liftoff debris analyses
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Shuttle Integrated Risk from Liftoff Debris
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• Catastrophic damage is possible given history of debris releases during liftoff
• All elements are vulnerable to some debris sources 
• Liftoff debris hazard is documented in Integrated Hazard Report IDBR-01
• Significant uncertainties exist in characterizing the liftoff debris environment 
through observation and analysis
Space Shuttle Program accepted risk to vehicle due to liftoff debris
– NSTS 60559 Vol III - Liftoff Debris Assessment Methodology 
– Liftoff debris mitigation steps and handling processes are documented
– Emergent  liftoff debris mitigations are resolved on per flight basis
